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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

GARRARD GARAGE AND IMPLEMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
GARRARD GARAGE

)

Supreme Court No. 920262

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
)
LEWIS H. MOUSLEY, RUTH M. MOUSLEY,
EFFIE P. MOUSLEY, OLIVE E.
)
MOUSLEY, FAIRALD R. MOUSLEY,
et. al,
)
Defendants/Appellees.

Civil No. C 88-1879

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT GARRARD GARAGE
APPEAL BY PLAINTIFF FROM JUDGMENT OF
THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
HON. SCOTT DANIELS
Arugment Priority Classification #16
Gayle Dean Hunt #1585
Steven A. Wuthrich #6055
GAYLE DEAN HUNT & ASSOCIATES
50 South 600 East, Suite 250
Telephone 355-3636
Attorneys for Appellant
Lewis H. Mousley, et al.
Appellees
Mitchell J. Olsen No. #3845
OLSEN & OLSEN
8138 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone 255-7176
Attorneys for Appellees

PARTIES_ON_APPEAL
Appellant is Garrard Garage and Implement Corporation.

Lewis H.

Mousley, Ruth M. Mousley, Effie P. Mouselyf Olive E. Mousley, Fairald
R. Mousley, Bayard W. Mousley, Owen Mousley, Arlin Mousley, Norma M.
Webb, and Elna M. Thompson are Appellees.
Defendants Spencer Blake, Erveena Blake, Pearl M. Nielsen and
Wyman I. Nielsen are no longer participating in the case.

They were

Assignees of Appellant's interest in the contract, and after Blakes
filed bankruptcy their interest was surrendered back to Garrard in
the bankruptcy proceedings.
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I^_

JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
U.C.A. 78-2-2 and may refer case to the Court of Appeals if it so
elects.
II^_ISSUES
ISSUE NO. 1:

Where the trial Court rules that a party's counsel

shall prepare proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
consistent with the Court's rulings and said counsel withdraws,
should the Court set aside the Findings, Conclusions and a Judgment
submitted by opposing counsel under Rule 60(a) when said Findings,
Conclusions, and Judgment are inconsistent with the Court's rulings?
ISSUE NO. 2:

Where the Judge finds both Buyer and Seller under

an installment real estate contract, which includes water stock, are
in breach, and orders a partial conveyance to Buyer and partial
foreclosure by Seller, is the Court required as a matter of law to
apportion the water stock?
ISSUE NO 3:

Under a contract for the sale of real property,

where Buyer pledges security for the performance of building a
bridge, did the Court err by awarding Seller the value of the
security as a measure of damages, but without deducting Seller's
concurrent savings for not having to build the bridge?
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111.^
(1)

STANDARD_OF_APPELLATE_REVIEW

With regards to the Motion to Set Aside Findings,

Conclusions and Judgment as a clerical error, Appellant maintains
this is a question of law (although the Appellate Courts have not
expressly so stated)

See, e.g. Meac[her_v^Egui.tY_2iJL_Co^, 5 Ut 2d

196, 299 P.2d 827 (1956); Li_nd s a ^ v ^ A t k i.n, 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984);
SL^rrin^ ton_v j„Wad e, 812 P.2d 452 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991).
(2)

With respect to the apportionment of the water stock,

Appellant believes this is a question of law.

There are no cases

construing the statute.
(3)

The issue of whether the Court properly awarded the correct

measure of damages for the failure to build a bridge is reviewed by
determining whether or not there is substantial, reasonable and
credible evidence supporting the Findings.

See KeJJ.e£_y^_Desej:et

Mo£tuary_Co_;_, 23 Ut.2d 1, 455 P.2d 197 (Utah 1969).

IV^

STATEMENT_OF_THE_CASE

A^_Nature_of _the_Ca.se
On February 1, 1978, Appellant Garrard Garage and Implement
Corporation entered into a real estate contract to buy approximately
46 acres of real property and appurtenant water stock from Appellees
Mousley (hereinafter enumerated).

Sellers were to "release" one acre

for every $7,000 principal paid to Buyer (excluding the $50,000 down
payment).

Buyers were to make annual payments and, within one year,

build a bridge along a specified portion of the land.
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Appellant assigned his rights under the contract to Defendants
Blake in the second year of the contract.

No bridge was constructed

as Appellant could not get permits from the County for the
appropriate right-of-way.

Payments were made, albeit late, through

1984, and accepted by Appellees.
The 1985 payment was placed in escrow, but later returned back
to buyers assignee (Blakes) and not received by Sellers.

No payments

were received from 1985 through 1989, the date of trial.
Sellers never executed the Special Warranty Deeds releasing the
one acre per $7,000 principal paid for the years 1980, 1981, 1982,
1983, and 1984 despite having received the monies.
The Contract had a specific additional security for the building
of the bridge, i.e. assignment of Appellant's rights under another
contract (the Lear Contract).

The Lear contract was a real estate

contract under which Garrard was selling unrelated real property to
the Lears, and was receiving payments.

The Lear Contract was to be

placed in escrow, and if the bridge was not built in one year, Seller
was to get the payments and utilize the monies received to build the
bridge. The Lear contract was never placed in escrow.
Eventually, Garrard filed suit to obtain the releases due for
monies paid, or rescind the contact with interest to Appellant.
Appellees answered and counterclaimed for foreclosure against Garrard
for failure to build the bridge and make payments after 1985.
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B^_

Facts_and_Course_of^_Pr;oceedi1n£S

1.

On February 1, 1978, Plaintiff Garrard Garage and Implement

Corporation (hereinafter "Garrard") entered into a real estate
contract to purchase approximately 46 acres of property located in
Salt Lake County, Utah for the sum of $250,000.00 from Defendants
Lewis H. Mousley, Ruth M. Mousley, Effie P. Mousley, Olive E.
Mousley, Fairald R. Mousley, Bayard W. Mousley, Owen Mousley, Arlin
Mousley, Norma Webb, and Elna M. Thompson (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "Mousley".)
Facts, R. p. 416-417)
2.

(See also R. p. 158-164)

The contract provided for conveyance by means of a "Special

Warranty Deed."
3.

(Exhibit 2, see also Stipulation of

(R. 158-164, paragraph 4)

The contract further provided that for each $7,000 that the

buyer paid toward principal (excluding the $50,000 down payment)
sellers were to "release" one acre to the buyer and that for every
six acres released on the 34-acre tract, one acre was to be released
on the 12-acre tract. (R. 158-164, paragraph 5)
4.

The conveyance by Special Warranty Deed was applicable to

the "releases" as well as to the entirety when the contract was fully
paid.

(R. 158-164, paragraph 4)
5.

In addition to the bare ground, the buyer was to receive 15

shares of Jordan Irrigation Company Water Stock and 40 shares Draper
Irrigation Company Water Stock.
6.

(R. 158-164, paragraph 2 ) .

In addition to annual payments, the buyer was to construct a

50-foot right-of-way alongside the 12-acre tract with a 16-foot
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bridge across the East Jordan Canal to connect the two tracts of
land.

Buyer was to place in escrow a certain Uniform Real Estate

Contract (hereinafter "Lear Contact") as security for the
aforementioned right-of-way and bridge construction.

The contract

further provided that, "In the event said right-of-way and bridge are
not constructed within one year, said Trustee shall_assi.2Q_§£i(3
22nt£§ct_to_sellers_for_the_£U£
^H^-^£M2§-L (emphasis added).
7.

(R. 158-164, paragraph 7)

Buyer made numerous payments totaling some $120,000 in

principal in addition to the $50,000 down payment (R. 416-424)
8.

No "releases" were executed by Sellers or their Trustees (R.

416-424).
9.

Buyer did not construct the right-of-way bridge within one

year, nor was the Lear Contract assignment properly placed in escrow.
(R. 416-424)
10.

The present action was filed on March 23, 1988, Appellant

herein seeking to obtain the "releases" justly due under the
contract, or any alternative rescision and money damages (R. 002008) .
11.

Defendants answered, asserting in part the Appellant's

breach for failure to construct the bridge and provide the Lear
Contract. (R. 08-21)
12.

After a 2-day Court trial ending 10-19-89, the Court, Hon.

Scott Daniels, made rulings from the bench and therein instructed
Appellant's counsel to prepare written Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. (R. 546-553).
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13.

On December 14, 1989, prior to preparation of the Findings

and Conclusions, Appellant's counsel terminated his relationship with
the Plaintiff. (R. 218)
14.

While Appellant was attempting to obtain substitute

counsel, Appellees' counsel submitted proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, which Findings and Conclusions were signed
February 8, 1990.

(R. 222-235)

The unsigned certificate of mailing

shows a copy sent to Tage Nyman, 1735 South West Temple (R. 235);
However, Mr. Nyman testified at trial that his address was 1144 South
300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 437).
15.

Thereafter, a Motion was filed by Neal Gunnarson to set

aside the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the grounds that
several pertinent portions of the Findings and Conclusions were
inconsistent with the Court's rulings.
16.

(R. 270-273)

For example, paragraph 9 of the Conclusions of Law purport

to grant Defendants a Judgment against Appellant for $18,850 plus
interest at 7 1/2% per annum from 1979 until the Judgment, plus
interest, is paid in full.
17.

No Notice of signing of Judgment has been filed or received

by Appellant.
18.

(R. 239)

(See Docket)

In December 1991, Appellant discovered title companies were

picking up the Judgment as a Judgment Lien on all properties of
Appellant, and filed an amended Motion to Set Aside Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, pointing out the inconsistencies between the
documents submitted by Appelles and signed by the Court and the
Court's own rulings in the case.
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19.

The Court, in its October 19, 1989 ruling stated that:
(a)

That the contract "imposes upon the buyer that
obligation to build a bridge and construct this rightof-way-"

(b)

(R. 547)

That "I don't think the doctrine of legal
impossibility excuses that requirement."

(c)

(R. 547)

That the exclusive remedy for the failure of buyers to
build a bridge is that taking of assignment of the
Lear

(d)

(sic) real estate contract."

(R. 5 4 8 ) .

That the failure to build a bridge did not excuse
Sellers from their obligation for release property.
(R. 548)

(e)

That this is a case in equity and the Court has a
right to fashion an equitable remedy.

(R. 548-549

(missed page))
(f)

What needs to be done is "figure out the value of the
Lear contract payments that were made under the Lear
contract and those amounts should be credited to the
Sellers since that contract should have gone to them.
So you take how much they should have gotten under the
Lear contract, including interest; you deduct that
from the amount of payments which are now due,
including interest, and the buyers can reinstate that
contract by making that payment."

(R. 548-549)
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20,

The Court then restated its ruling as follows:
Now, I am going to require the Sellers to
convey to the Buyers as many acres of property as
the buyers would be entitled to if they had been
making those conveyances all along. That_is x
2I12£_Z2u_fi2U££_the_amou^^
tll§«§in2^Qt_2i-t^§«t§§£_22Qt£§2t-L-theY_are
^Il^-i^§Z-^ilI_^§-I§2Mi£§^_t2«I!l§]i§-t^§t-.22IlY§Z§Ii2§
immediately;. And then if the buyers do reinstate
the contract, by making the payments, the seller
would be obligated to make further—at that time
and at that closing, sellers would be obligated
to make further conveyance of one acre per $7,000
based upon the amount they pay at the time the
contract is reinstated. If the contract is not
reinstated within 90 days, then an order of
foreclosure can enter. It can be foreclosed as
note and mortgage, but only on the amount of real
estate that's left after the first conveyance,
which I'm referring to now of one acre per every
$7,000 of principle paid. (R. 549) [emphasis
supplied]

21.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the

Judgment provides as follows:
(9) That the Mousleys be granted Judgment
against the Plaintiff on the Lear Contract, in
the amount of $18,850 (Eighteen Thousand Eight
Hundred Fifty Dollars) plus interest at the rate
of 7 1/2% (Seven and One Half Percent) from the
1st day of February, 1979, until the Judgment
amount plus interest is paid in full.
(10) That in the event the Plaintiff fails
to reinstate the agreement, the Mousleys be
granted Judgment against the Plaintiff in the
amount of $80,000 (Eighty Thousand Dollars) plus
accrued interest at the rate of 8% from August 1,
1984 through January 1, 1990, in the amount of
$37,682.36 (Thirty Seven Thousand Six Hundred
Eighty Two Dollars and thirty six cents) plus
interest of 17.53% per diem until the Judgment is
paid in full.
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(11) That the Mousleys convey to the
Plaintiff, by quit claim deed, a total of 17
(seventeen) acres of the real property set forth
in the Agreement (R. 222-247)
22.

The conveyances to Plaintiff were by quit claim deed in the

Findings and Conclusions rather than by special warranty deed as set
forth in the Contract and as ordered by the Court. (R. 248-253)
23.

The "valuation" of the Lear Contract in paragraph 9 was the

gross value, at inception of the contract, which contract was entered
into years prior to the date of assignment called for in the Garrard
Mousley agreement, and was calculated without any deduction for
payments received prior to the assignment date and without deduction
for encumbrances. (R. 227)

Rather than deduct the Lear Contract

"value" from the land to be conveyed to Appellant, the Findings and
Judgment give a money Judgment in direct opposition to the
instructions of the Court.
24.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law purport to

transfer 17 acres to Plaintiff under the release provision, thus not
offsetting the Lear Contract against property to be conveyed as set
forth in the Court's Rulings (R. 228-230)
25.

Appellees have tendered their transfer of the seventeen

acres, but only by quit claim deed. (R. 248-253)
26.

No Findings were made with respect to apportionment of the

water stock. (R. 546-553)
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27.

Thereafter

in May 1991, Appellant through Neal Gunnarson

filed a Motion to Set Aside the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

This Motion was amended by present counsel and the matter was

argued April 10, 1992.
Cj_

DisHOSition^^n^Court^Below

A two day Court trial was held October 12 & 19, 1989 before the
Honorable Scott Daniels. R. 412-545.
Court made its ruling

At the Conclusion thereof the

(as set out indetail in the facts section) R.

546-553.
Thereafter, and without completing the Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment, Appellant's counsel withdrew.

(R. 2 0 0 ) .

Appellees 1

counsel

submitted proposed Findings, Conclusions and a Judgment which was
signed by the Court on Februray 8, 1990. (R. 222-247).

The

Certificate of Mailing on the proposed Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment is unsigned and recties the wrong address for Tage Nyman
(President of Garrard).

(R. 235, 2 4 7 ) .

On May 16, 1990, a Motion to Set Aside The Findings and
Conclusions is filed by E. Neal, Gunnarson on behalf of Garrard.

On

December 23, 1991, an Amended Motion to Set Aside Findings and
Conclusions is filed by Garrard's present counsel. (R. 326-328)
Motion, after briefing, is heard by the Court on April 10, 1992,
wherein the Court denied the Motion stating:
But I think the bottom line on this case is
the fact that the issue is whether this is a
clerical error and comes under Rule 60 (a)
or not. And I just don't think it is.
Clerical error is you can say "Plaintiff"
instead of "Defendant" or you have a wrong

The

Page 11
number Ii i there because of a typo or
something like that. If it's even what you
say it is, that it is intentional overreaching, even if it's that, that's not a
clerical error. : don't think clerical
error occurs when there's a legitmate or
even a fanciful dispute as to what the Court
ordered and, therefore, question as to how
the Findings should be drafted. That is a
matter that needs to be handled by objection
to the Findings,, or at the very best, a
Motion to alter or amend them, or even at
the very best, a Motion to have them changed
for reasons of excusable neglect. And that
has to be within a reasonable time, not a
couple of years later. I just think under
the circumstances it's too 1 ate. 1 thi nk
that it needed to be done right after, two
and a half years ago, and it wasn't. And I
really don't think you have the power to
modify them or set them aside at this point
and, therefore, they will stand and the
Motion will be denied. (R. 5^4-575)
"T"

••

«.

j 9b.

Notice or Appeal wa

At trial, Oaiiard essentially sought recisio^ ••: +-he contract
-j-n

:

r^^nrn -,- f.he monies z.r* i < for thp Seller's breach,

breach.

The c- n>

remedy in eau*-

._,:••• t *

. , , . 'laoiiioneu1 a

.

r

-^4 <;n t-i cipated by either Darty,

:*

.1 :i E F i i i ::i:i i lgs -

C o n c l u s i o n s and Judgment d:
submi ^ ^ d *•

Mousleys

^ip]p"f

im

^ P ^ ^ " ^

UJUII
C

L

s i M . m y u.

ric-in-al

-»r m r

the

documents

-is a matter of
i:ii I ::: 1 .• = :i

tl: :i =

J aw.
c .] i :ie
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was not offset against land conveyed to Garrard as the Court
instructed, a money Judgment was granted Mousleys for the Lear
contract, contrary to the Court's instruction, and the land tendered
to Garrard was by quit claim deed rather than pursuant to the
contract (Special Warranty Deed) as instructed by the Court.
Mousleys argue that the time to set aside a Judgment under Rule
59 has passed, that this is not a clerical error and that no
objection to the proposed Findings, Conclusions and Judgment was
timely filed.

Mousleys have not addressed the failure to send notice

to Nyman's correct address or the fact that the certificate of
mailing is unsigned in the record.

VI^
1.

ARGUMENT_AND_AUTHORITIES

WHERE THE TRIAL COURT RULES THAT A PARTY'S COUNSEL PREPARE

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONSISTENT WITH THE
COURT'S RULINGS AND SAID COUNSEL WITHDRAWS, THE COURT SHOULD SET
ASIDE THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND JUDGMENT SUBMITTED BY OPPOSING
COUNSEL UNDER RULE 60(a) WHEN SAID FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
JUDGMENT ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S RULINGS.
U.R.C.P. Rule 60(a) provides:
Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in
Judgment, Orders, or other parts of the record
and errors therein arising from oversight or
omission may be corrected by the Court at any
time of its own initiative or on the Motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the
Court orders...

Page *.„,
x estcir-5 : r.hor* - --: IDOC,

whi/

. . ;« jrJers or juagmeri'^
J

vacate , set aside, c*

-

-

not accurately reflect the result or its Judgment.

Xi_i:-r^-i_°il -QoniEan.
Judge s i g n s
assuming

• *

an Order

that

J:

••

prepare

:orrectly

i.2

—

>

^ounsel,

reflects
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payments already made for the many years prior to the date of its
assignment.

It is not reasonable that one would assume this.

There

was no honest attempt at valuation done.
Second, and even more egregious, the amount was made into a
money Judgment rather than offset against the land awarded Garrard as
the Court expressly instructed.

There cannot be any argument that

the Court intended a money Judgment with regard to the Lear Contract
security.

The Court specifically stated not once, but twice, to

offset the amount of the Lear Contract as "valued" against the amount
of land to be conveyed under the release provisions to Appellant.

In

short, when the Court ordered that the land to be conveyed be offset
against the money Garrard owed for failure to deliver the Lear
Contract proceeds, Mousleys1 counsel submitted proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law which awarded a money Judgment instead.
This clearly falls within the parameters of a clerical error since
the Judgment is not as the Court rendered it.
Finally, the Court ordered that the releases were to be conveyed
"pursuant to the Contract."
talk about quit claim deeds.

Nowhere in the contract does it ever
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law and Judgment make the award to be by quit claim deed.

The

contract consistently refers only to special warranty deeds.
Accordingly, the very conveyance which the Court ordered the
Appellees to make, were thwarted and the conveyance is only a mere
quit claim deed, not a marketable deed, and not the special warranty
deed bargained for by the parties, or as instructed by the Court.
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There is manifest injustice
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BREACH, AND ORDERS A PARTIAL CONVEYANCE TO BUYER AND A PARTIAL
FORECLOSURE BY SELLER, THE COURT IS REQUIRED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO
APPORTION THE WATER STOCK.
Utah Code ss 78-37-6 provides as follows:
Right of redemption - Sales by Parcels- Of land
and water stock. Sales of real estate under
judgments of foreclosure of mortgages and liens
are subject to redemption as in case of sales
under executions generally. Ill_all_cases_where
th^iudgment^direct^
wi.th_sha£es_of_co££ora^
t2_§_wate£_r i2.^t-M§£^«2£-ill£§D.^§^--i2--^£-.H§£^jL-2I
£yi^§ble_for_usex_on_the_l
£3Hit§^IZ_§EP2£ti2Il«§ii2^-^§^§£-.§t22]i_£2_i:^£--i§Il^x
2£-§251§-E§£t-_tll§£§2l.x-ill--2Il§--2t^n!2£§«E§£2§.I§jL_§§
l§n^_§Q^_w§ter_stock_iji^
t22§ther^_and_for_the_£urgose^
redem£tion__as_aboye_speci.f ^ed. In all sales of
real estate under foreclosure the Court may
determine the parcels and the order in which such
parcels of property shall be sold, [emphasis
supplied]
There are no cases construing the statute cited above.

However,

it is clear that the legislature has made this statute mandatory.

It

is equally apparent, that there is a policy underlying this statute,
a land management policy, which has roots of more significant concern
than that of the dispute between the parties before the Court.
legislature is against making irrigated land into arid land.
a generational concern.

Our
This is

This land which will pass from generation to

generation, and has greater impact on the well-being and welfare of
the State than do the equities of the particular parties tending to
own it at the moment.

Where the Court, as in this instance, took it
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present case, the Court did not order the bridge to be built, and
could not have inasmuch as the county land use restrictions were the
reason that the Buyer, Garrard, could not build the subject bridge.
To award the value of the security, in lieu of the bridge, is
manifest injustice.

The Sellers have saved the cost of the bridge

and therefore have no need to take security.

A fact finder should

not be permitted to arbitrarily ignore competent, credible and
uncontradicted evidence; nevertheless, he is not bound to slavishly
follow the evidence in figures given by any particular witness and,
w i t h i. n_ 1 im i t s_o f _r e a son, is it his prerogative to place his own
appraisal upon the evidence which impresses him as credible and draw
conclusions therefrom in accordance with his own best Judgment.

Even

Odd sx_I nc ^ y ^ N i e 1 son , 22 Ut. 2d, 49, 448 P.2d 709 (Utah 1968).

The

desired objective, in computing damages, is to evaluate any loss
suffered by the most direct, practical and accurate method that can
be employed, id.

In the present case, the damages awarded the

Sellers, Mousleys, do not put Mousleys in as good a position as they
would have been in had there not been a breach.
in a better position.

It puts the Sellers

They get not only their security, but are

relieved of their obligation to build a bridge concurrent therewith.
They've doubled their money.

Such manifest injustice cannot go

undaunted.
While the Court may not have been able to review this question
had the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law not contained the
clerical errors discussed in Part 1 of this brief, inasmuch as the
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of land from the Sellers to the Buyer, should be by special warranty
deed and not by quit claim deed in accordance with the original
ruling by the Court.
DATED this 16th day of November, ,1992.

Steven A. 'Withrich
GAYLE DEAN HUNT & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Garrard Garage
I mailed 4 copies of the foregoing on November 16, 1992 to the
following:
Mitchell J. Olsen No. #3845
OLSEN & OLSEN
8138 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone 2 55-7176

